True self-love and true self-sacrifice by Lippitt, John
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 “True self-love and true self-sacrifice” 
„You shall love your neighbour as yourself‟.1 But how do I, and how should I, love myself?  
According to Harry Frankfurt in his recent book The Reasons of Love, true self-love is „the 
deepest and most essential ... achievement of a serious and successful life‟.2 Recent naturalist 
accounts of self-love like Frankfurt‟s have been criticised for lacking a concept of self-
sacrifice or self-denial.
3
 Yet self-love and self-sacrifice are notorious problems in Christian 
thought, and the tradition is littered with apparently incompatible claims about them. For 
Kierkegaard, „self-denial ... is Christianity‟s essential form‟.4 Whereas for Alasdair 
MacIntyre, „self-sacrifice ... is as much of vice, as much of a sign of inadequate moral 
development, as selfishness‟.5  
Countless philosophers and theologians have grappled with the problem of true self-love.
 
This article takes its cue from the distinction in Kierkegaard‟s Works of Love between true 
and improper forms of self-love, and the relation between true self-love and self-sacrifice.
 
Numerous commentators have pointed out that Kierkegaard makes a version of the former 
distinction. M. Jamie Ferreira, for instance, notes his distinction between „proper‟ and 
„selfish‟ [selvisk] self-love, while a similar contrast between defensible and indefensible 
forms of self-love that associates the latter with selfishness is found in the analyses of Sylvia 
Walsh and Claudia Welz.
6
 Walsh claims that the following is Kierkegaard‟s view:  
„Christian love is self-denying love. Proper self-love is achieved inversely through 
the renunciation of selfishness; love of others is expressed by the transferral of one‟s 
own desires and love of oneself to the neighbor through self-sacrifice and a 
willingness to endure any amount of ill for the neighbor‟s sake; and love of God is 
2 
 
shown by inwardly realizing one‟s nothingness before the divine and becoming an 
instrument in the deity‟s service.‟7  
Welz claims that the affirmation of love as self-sacrifice that one finds in both Kierkegaard 
and Levinas should be read against the background of their critique of selfish love.
8
  
In aiming to advance our understanding of true self-love,
9
 I argue, first, that the term „selfish‟ 
is a too vague (and sometimes downright inaccurate) contrast term to use. To illustrate why, I 
draw on Robert Merrihew Adams‟ distinction between selfishness and another „vice of self-
preference‟,10 self-centredness. Second, in trying to understand self-sacrifice, I draw upon 
feminist worries about its valorisation, but rather than ditch the concept (as some feminists 
have argued that we should), I consider Ruth Groenhout‟s suggestion that we would be better 
off trying to understand where proper self-sacrifice fits on a sliding scale between self-
limitation and self-annihilation.
11
 Finally, these reflections lead in a perhaps surprising 
direction: the need to rehabilitate a certain species of pride as a virtue that is integral to true 
self-love. I close by sketching what form such pride, necessary to avoid the dangerous slide 
from proper self-sacrifice to outright self-annihilation, should take.  
1. Selfishness and self-centredness 
It is not hard to see why „selfishness‟ might be chosen as the opposite term to true self-love. 
Indeed, Christian love is often described as „selfless‟, a term to which „selfish‟ looks like a 
natural antonym.
12
 But what does „selfish‟ mean? Consider two dictionary definitions:  
„concerned chiefly with one‟s own profit or pleasure at the expense of consideration for 
others‟.13  
„caring too much about oneself and not enough about others‟ and/or „(of behaviour or 
attitude) motivated by self-interest‟.14   
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These fit with the link between selfishness and exclusivity made in Kierkegaard‟s critique of 
erotic love and friendship.
15
 They also begin to bring out what we might call the grasping, 
acquisitive element of selfishness. But even such basic definitions are enough to suggest that 
merely avoiding selfishness in this sense would not be sufficient to be able to claim truly to 
love oneself. The mere fact that I love and care about others as well as myself - thus avoiding 
the exclusivity charge - does not make my self-love legitimate. In order to see why not, we 
should note two things. First, that the term selfishness does not seem to capture many of the 
examples Kierkegaard himself uses of „improper‟ self-love. None of „the bustler‟ who 
„wastes his time and powers in the service of futile, inconsequential pursuits‟; „the light-
minded person‟ who „throws himself almost like a nonentity into the folly of the moment‟; 
„the depressed person‟ who „desires to be rid of life, indeed, of himself‟; or the person who 
„surrenders to despair‟16 seem well described by the term „selfish‟. If we are tempted to 
describe the would-be suicide as selfish – on the grounds that he is thinking solely of himself 
and not others affected by his suicide - I suggest we should be given pause in reaching this 
conclusion by considering the important distinction between selfishness and self-centredness.   
In  A Theory of Virtue, Robert Merrihew Adams has recently argued that self-centredness is a 
„vice of self-preference that is distinguishable from selfishness‟.17 One can still be 
inappropriately self-centred despite lacking the „grasping‟ or acquisitive quality  attributed to 
selfishness above. This, I take it, is what Adams means when he says that self-centredness „is 
not in general to be understood in terms of what one wants‟.18 To illustrate this, he gives an 
example of a father playing basketball with his young daughter. As Adams sets this up, the 
father desires that all of the following apply: they have fun; they take the activity seriously; 
and they do their best at it. The father genuinely wants both his daughter and himself to enjoy 
themselves, so his concern is not selfish (in the sense of exclusive), as he genuinely cares 
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about his daughter and her enjoyment. But Adams points out that this description applies 
equally to two possible cases. In the first, the father thinks about what a good father he is 
being; how good he is at basketball for a man not as young as he once was; and how he 
wishes his father had done this with him.  In the second, the father thinks about how much his 
daughter enjoys basketball; how good at it she‟s getting; and what a „neat kid‟ she is.19 
Why, ceteris paribus, do we think less of the father in the first case than in the second? The 
answer lies not in his being selfish, but in his being too self-centred. In both cases, Adams 
suggests, we may presume that the father desires all of the following: to be a good father; his 
daughter‟s physical and social development; and that the father-daughter relationship is good 
and healthy.  
„The difference between the two cases is rather a difference in focus. In wanting a 
largely relational complex of ends essentially involving oneself it is possible for one‟s 
interest to be centred overwhelmingly on one‟s own role in the complex, or much more 
on other persons, or other features, involved in it. Self-centredness, as its name 
suggests, is typically a perversion in this sort of centering.‟20 
In other words, Adams is drawing our attention to different ways in which the self can loom 
too large in one‟s life: in one‟s desires or in one‟s thoughts. While it seems appropriate to 
describe the former as selfishness, we need another term – self-centredness, or something like 
it - for the latter.  
We can extrapolate from this distinction. Various „vices of self-preference‟ (Adams‟ term) or 
self-focus (mine) – such as arrogance and vanity  – can and should be distinguished from 
selfishness.
21
 And yet – if we recall the centrality to Kierkegaard‟s thought of „becoming a 
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self‟22 – we need to make room for a proper kind of self-focus too. As a preliminary, note 
Adams‟ observation that self-regard of various kinds is ubiquitous in human motivation:  
„The class of self-regarding motives is very wide – so wide that they are probably 
involved in almost all our actions. Desiring a relationship for its own sake – whether 
one desires the continuance of one‟s marriage, or to be a good parent or friend to so-
and-so – is always a self-regarding motive, inasmuch as the relationship essentially 
involves oneself. Likewise conscientiousness is a self-regarding motive, inasmuch as it 
is a commitment to act rightly oneself‟.23 
It makes no sense, therefore, to condemn all kinds of self-regard or self-focus. But is there no 
more to be said about legitimate and culpable forms of self-focus than that so many of our 
actions are in various ways self-regarding? It is here that the feminist critique of self-sacrifice 
becomes important.  
2. A feminist critique of self-sacrifice 
In a classic, much cited article, Valerie Saiving Goldstein argued that men and women are 
prone to different types of sin: men to pride, women to „triviality, distractibility, and 
diffuseness; lack of an organizing center or focus; dependence on others for one‟s own self-
definition; tolerance at the expense of standards of excellence ... in short, under-development 
or negation of the self‟.24 
The view of pride as the ultimate sin,
25
 and the valorisation of self-sacrifice in response, may 
be a perfectly appropriate diagnosis and cure for males, but disastrous for females, since the 
proposed cure simply reinforces what is, for Goldstein, woman‟s besetting sin. Later 
feminists, such as Barbara Andolsen, have suggested that: „Women have a tendency to give 
themselves over to others to such an extent that they lose themselves. Thus they squander 
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their distinctive personal abilities. ... a one-sided call to a self-sacrifice ... may ironically 
reinforce women‟s sins.‟26 A major part of the worry here is that this makes normative for 
women a set of values that ensure their subordination – and in some cases even leads to a 
blind eye being turned to abuse. 
But the danger with this, of course, as Sarah Coakley notes,
27
 is one of excessive 
generalisation and crude stereotypes of both genders (such gender essentialism as „all men 
are vain and arrogant; all women are oppressed into submissiveness‟). Yet early feminists 
such as Goldstein and her successors shed important light on the role of self-denial and self-
sacrifice in Christian thought and practice.  Beyond the stereotypes, the worry that one can 
sin by „failing to establish oneself as a self‟, as Darlene Fozard Weaver puts it,28 seems a very 
important observation. And for all the emphasis on self-denial in some of his works, it also 
contains an important echo of Kierkegaard.  Recall The Sickness Unto Death‟s famous 
observation that: „The greatest hazard of all, losing the self, can occur very quietly in the 
world, as if it were nothing at all. No other loss can occur so quietly; any other loss - an arm, 
a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. - is sure to be noticed.‟29 The point is that excessive self-
sacrifice or self-abnegation can potentially be at least as big a worry as excessive self-love.  
I suggest that this shows the value of the project Ruth Groenhout pursues: to offer a 
classification of kinds of self-sacrifice, noting their relation to selfhood. As a Christian 
feminist, Groenhout argues that important though the dangers are against which several of her 
fellow feminists have warned, „self-sacrifice is an important part of feminist theory in 
general‟ and that „any feminism worth its salt will have to incorporate some notion of self-
sacrifice into its theoretical apparatus‟.30 Groenhout‟s taxonomy builds upon the typology of 
possible meanings of kenosis in the Christian tradition discussed by Coakley. Coakley notes a 
„sliding-scale of meanings‟ of kenosis „from “risk” to “self-limitation” to “sacrifice” to “self-
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giving” to “self-emptying” – and even to “annihilation”‟.31 Groenhout argues that this list is 
too broad: the incarnation, atonement and resurrection of Christ can hardly be captured 
adequately by the term „risk‟, and at the other end of the spectrum, outright „annihilation‟ of 
the self is incompatible with orthodox Christianity. Further, „sacrifice‟ is insufficiently 
determined to occupy a definite place on the list, and is better thought of as a general 
category of which the others are sub-categories.
32
 But most of the middle ground, she 
suggests, is promising territory, especially if we add in between self-limitation and sacrifice 
giving up prerogatives to which one‟s nature entitles one. Let us explore this.  
 
Groenhout reads self-limitation as retaining a definite continuity of selfhood: „The limitations 
imposed are imposed by the self, implying that the self retains some sense of robust 
identity.‟33 Also, though self-limitation can be performed for others (such as when a poverty-
striken single parent denies herself food so that her children may eat), it can also be done in 
the interests of a higher good which has no real reference outside the self‟s ends at all (such 
as denying oneself tasty but high-fat foods in a bid to lose weight). Insofar as there is no 
necessary reference to the other, then, we do not seem yet to be very close to kenosis proper.  
More likely to be other-directed is „giving up prerogatives that are due one on the basis of 
one‟s nature‟.34 What Groenhout has in mind here is that a sense of a core self or identity is 
retained, but what is owed to that self is temporarily set aside. She doesn‟t give examples, but 
I suggest the following: a worker employed by a charity undergoing cash-flow problems 
might temporarily forego the salary to which they are legitimately entitled in order that the 
charity‟s good work may continue.  
This seems to me to slide into what Groenhout calls self-giving where, unlike with mere self-
limitation, we have „some measure of giving up self-determination‟.35 This is also necessarily 
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directed towards the other, since „to give of oneself is not possible unless there is a 
recipient‟.36  
And so we reach full-blown self-sacrifice, in which „in some significant way the self is 
actually lost‟.37 Groenhout suggests this is again best understood as operating over a range, 
starting with „some sort of denial of the self‟ which can still be a giving up of one part of the 
self for the sake of another part of the self. This is puzzling, since without further explanation 
(which she does not offer) it is unclear how this differs from the more modest kind of self-
limitation. Perhaps what she has in mind is something like a life-long monastic vow of 
celibacy, since here I would be renouncing part of my former life forever, in the interests of a 
good I now perceive as higher. (Whereas, in the diet case, once our dieter hits one hundred 
and fifty pounds, he will celebrate by allowing himself a large chunk of brie.) At its height, 
however, self-sacrifice involves giving up the self, or life itself, altogether, for some other 
person(s) or good. This teleological aspect is important, as it distinguishes self-sacrifice from 
mere self-destruction or self-annihilation.  
This distinction, and a related point about how self-sacrifice can easily slide into self-
annihilation, is crucial for Groenhout‟s analysis. She notes that: „The paradox of kenotic self-
emptying arises because the self that is emptied must continue to exist as a self to be 
emptied.‟38 Self-annihilation fails this test. But as an example of how it can be mistaken for 
self-sacrifice, Groenhout cites the following passage from Simone Weil:
39
 
„I cannot conceive of the necessity for God to love me, when I feel so clearly that even 
with human beings affection for me can only be a mistake. But I can easily imagine that 
he loves that perspective of creation which can only be seen from the point where I am 
... I must withdraw so that he can see it. I must withdraw so that God may make contact 
with the beings whom chance places in my path and whom he loves. ... It is as though I 
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were placed between two lovers or two friends. I am not the maiden who awaits her 
betrothed, but the unwelcome third who is with two betrothed lovers and ought to go 
away so that they can really be together.‟40 
What we see here is precisely the kind of self-annihilation about which feminists are rightly 
concerned. In this passage, Weil presents herself as intrinsically unlovable, a view that seems 
based on a sense of herself as lacking intrinsic value. In doing so, she fails to pay attention to 
the „as yourself‟ of the second love commandment. The view of herself as merely an obstacle 
to God‟s being able to be alone with his creation fails to recognise herself as a unique part of 
that creation. In contrast to this, Groenhout argues, proper self-sacrifice „must emphasize the 
worth of the self that is emptied out‟.41 
What this suggests is two-fold. First, that the self which is to be in some sense sacrificed is, 
and must be recognized as, something with intrinsic value: „the self-emptying that Jesus 
models for us originates in recognizing that, since the self is precious, emptying it really is a 
sacrifice‟.42 Merely squandering the self is morally objectionable. (Adams suggests: „In many 
contexts children who take an effective interest in their own good are “being good”, and 
children who don‟t are letting the side down, damaging a project in which others have 
invested much‟.43 This seems right – and not only in the case of children.) The second point 
follows from this: that proper self-sacrifice is not self-sacrifice for its own sake, but rather 
needs to be oriented towards the good. (In the absence of Christianity‟s claims about its 
salvific power, Christ‟s death on the cross is arguably just tragic.44) If this is right, then 
nobody - of either gender - should commend themselves for the fact that they have made of 
themselves a doormat for their oppressors. This is so in part because by failing to resist 
oppression, we contribute to the advance of evil rather than good.
45
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Of course, Groenhout‟s (or any other) taxonomy will hardly give us an easy set of techniques 
that guarantee appropriate behaviour in any circumstances: practical wisdom will still be 
needed. But such observations on proper self-sacrifice arising from feminist theology do 
remind us of the need to recognise the importance of true self-love in our deliberations about 
self-sacrifice. The Christian tradition has perhaps tended to warn more forcefully of the 
dangers of improper self-love than of improper self-sacrifice. But either, taken to an extreme, 
can be both practically disastrous and incompatible with the Christian ideal.
46
  
We should also recognise that true self-love and love of others are often inextricably linked. 
On this point, consider the fuller version of the passage from MacIntyre I quoted in the 
opening paragraph:  
„We do indeed as infants, as children and even as adolescents, experience sharp 
conflicts between egoistic and altruistic impulses and desires. But the task of education 
is to transform and integrate those into an inclination towards both the common good 
and our individual goods, so that we become neither self-rather-than-other-regarding 
nor other-rather-than-self-regarding, neither egoists nor altruists, but those whose  
passions and inclinations are directed to what is both our good and the good of others. 
Self-sacrifice, it follows, is as much of vice, as much of a sign of inadequate moral 
development, as selfishness.‟47 
In other words, a vital part of true self-love may involve combining the good for oneself and 
the good for others in a way that makes the language of self-sacrifice (and of egoism versus 
altruism) inappropriate. Daniel Russell makes a similar point about self-respect (which I have 
already suggested must surely be part of true self-love).
48
 Taking as an example the lawyer 
Atticus Finch‟s decision to defend Tom Robinson in Harper Lee‟s To Kill a Mockingbird, 
Russell notes that evading this unpopular decision would be unthinkable for Atticus. Why? 
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Because, he tells his young daughter, it would betray everything he believes in. But to ask 
whether he does this out of respect for himself or respect for Tom sets up a false opposition. 
Having good will towards and acting to help a man whom he sincerely believes to be 
innocent is part of who Atticus is. Thus „the line between respecting oneself and respecting 
others no longer seems very sharp‟.49 There is no practical difference between Atticus‟ acting 
out of respect for himself and acting out of respect for Tom: both the action and the reason 
for the action are the same.  
Adams makes a related point about how the good for me can be deeply interrelated to the 
good for my community:  
„Self-love can be positively rather than negatively related to community. Fully 
accepting my own membership in a good community involves accepting my own good 
as a project, both as a common project of the community and as part of the common 
good. At the same time my good is a project that a good community regards, and 
expects me to regard, as mine to care about in a special way (though not necessarily 
more than about the good of others or in isolation from the good of others). Being 
willing to be special to myself in this way is appropriately responsive to my place in 
communities (not to mention my place in the universe). This is a relatively unalienated 
and unselfish way of taking my own good as a project. Are you tempted to feel guilty 
(as some people do) about ever pursuing your own good when it competes at all with 
the good of others? Then ask yourself whether you really think a society that did not 
have your good too as part of a common project would be an excellent society.‟50 
One particularly fruitful resource for understanding what constitutes a contemporary account 
of true self-love is the work of Charles Taylor.
51
 Though a full account of this is beyond the 
scope of the present article, Taylor brings together very lucidly several of the above points. 
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An adequate conception of self-love needs to take into account the fact that we are self-
interpreting beings whose sense of ourselves is intimately related to our purposes. Yet we are 
also dialogical creatures, immersed in „webs of interlocution‟52 such that in an important 
sense we cannot be selves on our own. The ideas that my own self-interpretation matters; that 
I have projects and a sense of myself as leading a life (in other words, that I live by 
commitments that I have made my own; appropriated) and the centrality of love of the good to 
the ethical life all need to be taken into consideration in an account of true self-love and the 
relation between self-love and self-sacrifice. And as we noted, this love of the good is 
threatened if I make myself a mere doormat in your interests, as certain more extreme forms 
of self-sacrifice seem to commend.  
I want in the remainder of this article to draw upon what I have said so far to argue that a 
certain kind of pride is an important aspect of true self-love. How so? 
3. Pride: vice or virtue? 
As we noted, within the Christian tradition, pride is usually considered to be one of the seven 
deadly sins; indeed, often, the source of all sin. Pride, on this view, looks like an obvious 
manifestation of excessive or improper self-love.
53
 It is commonly conflated with some or all 
of the following:  a refusal to admit one‟s dependence upon God; a sense of one‟s superiority 
to others; arrogance; and vanity. St Thomas Aquinas‟  description of pride, in the course of an 
explanation as to why it is a sin, captures most if not all of these: „pride [superbia] is so 
called because a man thereby aims higher than he is‟.54 And such a view is hardly exclusive 
to Christians. A very similar definition is given by Spinoza, according to whom: „Pride 
should be defined as the pleasure arising from false belief, in that a man thinks himself above 
others. Pride is the pleasure arising from a man‟s thinking too highly of himself‟.55 
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I would argue that the true picture is rather more complex than this. Tara Smith has argued 
that pride can function as a virtue.
56
 Moreover, she does this in a way that is not just a return 
to Aristotle (for whom a species of pride was of course a virtue).
57
 Pride‟s bad press means 
that we can easily be blinded to the thought that many things we might ordinarily call true 
self-love  or self-respect contain an important element of pride. Two of Smith‟s examples are 
a student‟s unwillingness to turn in what he considers to be less than his best work and an 
unemployed person‟s seeking out work rather than begging for charity.58 These may both be 
manifestations of pride, but hardly instances of vice, let alone sin. Smith offers the following 
definition of pride in the ethical sphere:  
„To be proud is to set high moral standards and to strive to become ever better in 
attaining them, i.e., more alert to all their demands and more consistent in fulfilling 
them ... pride, as a virtue, is the disposition to practice proper and demanding moral 
standards‟.59 
Think of this as the application to the ethical realm of the idea of taking pride in one‟s work. 
And you would hardly assume that you were being accused of sinfulness if you overheard a 
colleague appreciatively saying of you that you take a real pride in your work.
60
  
Note that thus understood pride, far from being mere self-satisfaction or a „savoring of past 
glories‟, is future-oriented. The proud person, in this sense, sets herself very high standards; 
won‟t settle for anything less; and consequently views the self as something upon which 
ethical work needs continually to be done. This sounds to me like an important aspect of true 
self-love. Indeed, Smith concludes: „The virtue of pride builds and bespeaks healthy love of 
self.‟61  
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Such pride is a very long way from vanity; the proud person is not to be equated with the 
„vain, pompous show-off who is not content with her own self-estimate, but broadcasts her 
feats to make sure that everyone else is aware of them, as well‟.62 In comparison to that, 
humility does seem attractive. But such vainglorious self-preening is, Smith argues, 
counterfeit pride, insofar as it seems to display an inappropriate need for the good opinion of 
others.
63
  
Smith also makes a point about one of the psychological payoffs of pride that serves as an 
important corrective to an excessive stress on self-sacrifice. Pride, she claims, „nourishes self-
esteem. Insofar as a positive view of oneself is necessary to live – to the will to live, and to 
one‟s sense of worthiness to live – this is its most significant payoff‟.64 This does seem, I 
suggest, a vital aspect of true self-love. The need for a positive view of oneself – as someone 
who has a sense of self-worth, and whose life is meaningful and valuable – is standardly and 
quite reasonably accepted as a vital aspect of psychological health.
65
 Indeed, it is 
questionable whether a person lacking such a sense of herself could function as a moral agent 
at all. „She needs‟, as Smith puts it, „a minimum of self-regard to consider her actions 
sufficiently significant to matter.‟66 Relatedly, Paul Ricoeur suggests that such a basic 
element of true self-love may be crucial for other-relatedness: „Must one not, in order to 
make oneself open, available, belong to oneself in a certain sense?‟67 Smith views a virtuous 
circle as operating thus:  
„Pride encourages moral action, which, in turn, nourishes belief in one‟s goodness; this 
belief reinforces one‟s commitment to strengthening that moral character. The practice 
of pride thus enables a person honestly to think of herself as fit to live, able to act as she 
should and to achieve all the rewards of so doing‟.68 
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Similarly, Russell suggests that a minimal self-respect is necessary in the first place to 
develop as a virtuous person – but that as one develops, the self one respects changes into 
someone increasingly worthy of respect.
69
  
We can return to Adams for a more specific point: an important one in a society of increasing 
life-expectancy. He notes how we admire „those whose commitment to their own well-being 
sustains them through a long and painful struggle to recover from a potentially disabling 
injury‟,70 and how old age „can set a context in which caring for oneself necessarily looms 
larger in one‟s concerns, and we do admire people whose loyalty to their own good helps 
them to care for it sensibly and gives them the will to go on in that context‟.71 Moreover, for 
the elderly and frail, „caring for oneself may become not only a very large part of what one 
can do, but also a large part of what other people desire of one‟.72 The person who values 
their life sufficiently to maintain it in such circumstances hardly deserves our ire for being 
either „selfish‟ or self-centred. This, too, is a significant dimension of true self-love: an 
excellent illustration of Adams‟ more general point that „easily recognisable excellence in 
caring for one‟s own good is often overlooked because moral perception is distracted by 
worries about selfishness‟.73 
Finally, this last point enables us more clearly to say what is wrong with the view from Weil 
discussed in section 2 above. Russell suggests that „having a blind spot about one‟s own 
value is a defect in one‟s understanding of values, and is therefore incompatible with the 
possession of practical wisdom‟.74 More precisely, we can say that what Weil‟s view sorely 
lacks is a deep and firm commitment to oneself (one‟s interests; judgements; values; goals 
and development) as being worthy of love and respect. Note how this introduces a reflective 
element: not just any kind of self-commitment (such as the unreflective „me, me, me‟ attitude 
of the selfish child) will do.
75
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
I have argued that in attempting to understand true self-love, we need to be careful about 
terminology. Pace some prominent commentators on Kierkegaard‟s Works of Love, not all 
vices of self-focus can be captured under the heading of selfishness. But the vice of self-
centredness has a far more handsome cousin, proper self-focus of the kind necessary for 
„becoming a self‟. As various feminist thinkers have enabled us to see, that proper self-focus 
will be missed if we valorise self-sacrifice too uncritically. But nor need the concept of self-
sacrifice be ditched. By distinguishing points along a sliding scale of self-sacrifice, we can 
see the importance of avoiding the all too easy slide from appropriate forms thereof to 
outright self-annihilation. And we can notice, perhaps surprisingly, that this avoidance can be 
aided by recognising a certain species of pride as a vital part of true self-love.
76
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